With the increasing popularity of DIY bioengineering and the growing threat of weaponizing pathogens, the regulation of synthetic biology is playing an ever-larger role in our national security. The BHR kit in particular has direct ethical and safety repercussions, considering its potential malapplication in engineering bioweapons. In order to evaluate the ethicality of our project, our team investigated the national biosafety regulations surrounding our research and employed the feedback of bioethics experts, biotech companies, and local Austin DIY labs.

To ensure that the BHR kit’s future distribution and application would be ethical and safe, we sought the advice of some of The University of Texas’ leading biosafety and bioethics experts. We consulted Dr. Shelley Payne, a researcher, professor of molecular biosciences, and previous chair of the UT Institutional Biosafety Committee, who provided us with insight on the potential ethical and safety issues of our kit. Dr. Payne expressed that though our BHR kit may expedite the initial characterization of non-model organisms, the kit does not necessary expedite the identification and cloning of virulent genes in pathogenic bacteria, which in Dr. Payne’s view, is where the true danger lies. Despite Dr. Payne’s expression of the relatively low risk of the BHR kit, we still had concerns over the improper distribution of the kit. In response to our logistical concerns, Dr. Payne recommended utilizing a third party distributor, such the American Type Culture Collection, to ensure the safe and responsible dissemination of our BHR kit. We took Dr. Payne’s feedback into consideration as we continued developing the BHR kit and planning for its future distribution.

Continuing with our pursuit of creating an ethically robust kit, we consulted Dr. Alan Lloyd, a researcher, professor of molecular biosciences, and the current chair of the UT Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which reviews all campus research involving recombinant DNA. Dr. Lloyd expressed his concern over the growing threat of DIY bioengineers who are gaining an increasing capability to perform sophisticated biological work due to increasing access to bioengineering tools. According to Dr. Lloyd, because the BHR kit may play a role in the process of characterizing and modifying non-model organisms, a particular danger of the BHR kit is its potential in engineering and weaponization of the human microbiota. To potentially avoid these dangers, Dr. Lloyd directed us to the guidelines for identifying and regulating Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) and encouraged us to attend an IBC meeting and self-review our research under the DURC guidelines. Though Dr. Lloyd saw some potential danger in the application of the BHR kit, overall, he did not see any more danger in our research than any other research conducted in the university.